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DEVALUATION AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS IN ECOWAS COUNTRIES:
A STUDY OF NIGERIA'S EXCHANGE RATE POLICY
INTRODUCTION

members devalued by 11.1 per cent, or the same percentage
rate. However, countries in the sterling area adopted varying
policies in response to the devaluation of pound sterling in
1967. For example, while Sierra Leone and the Gambia devalued by 14.3 per cent, being the full extent of the rates of
the British devaluation, Nigeria did not devalue.
The Realignment of currencies in December 1971 following the breakdown of the Bretton Wood System provided
another opportunity for exchange rate adjustments. Again, a
great number of countries of Africa adjusted their exchange
rates in line with the pound sterling or the French franc
amounting to an appreciation of the order of 8.57 per cent in
terms of United States' dollar. Nigeria accepted a neutral
exchange rate action which also amounted to appreciation of
8.57 per cent. However, in February 1973, Nigeria devalued
by JO per cent, following the devaluation of the United
States dollar by 10 per cent in the same month. Subsequently, Nigeria allowed the Naira to appreciate with respect to a
number of major currencies such as the pound sterling, the
French franc and the Japanese yen. However, the naira
depreciated progressively with respect to the De_utsche mark
and the Netherland guilder, and remained virtually stabilised
to the United States dollar. In view of the growing risks of
foreign reserve losses due to fluctuations in the exchange
value of the pound sterling the Nigerian authorities decided
to detach its peg from the pound sterling and peg to the
United States dollar. This policy has now been changed in
favour of determining the exchange rate in terms of a group
of key currencies weighted by the shares of Nigeria's import
trade with the issuing countries. Charts I and II show the
movements of the naira in relation to key currencies as from
1973. These movements, based on currency ratios to the
naira in February, 1973, indicate further that, as from 1976,
the naira has been depreciating with respect to a large number of key currencies. Nevertheless, it is also clear that the
average rates of depreciation remain small.
The purpose of this paper is to review Nigeria's exchange
rate policy as outlined abov.e, and in doing so, one finds it
compelling, and hopefully rewarding, to take a general look
at the exchange rate policies in selected African countries,
focussing particularly on the effects of devaluation on balance of payments. Accordingly, the paper first presents an
analytical framework in which a monetary approach is considered most useful. The next section introduces a simplified
monetary model. Following that, there is a discussion of statistical testing and results. The final secti~n considers the
implications for policy in Nigeria, apprafaing in some detail
the case for exchange rate depreciation.

As the price of a currency in terms of another, exchange
rate plays a very important role in national and international
economy. 1 To some policy makers it is a barometer which
measures the relative strength of an economy overtime. When
viewed in this light a depreciating rate implies a weakening of
the competitive position of the economy whereas an exchange rate appreciation would lead them to believe that the
economy is performing relatively well. To others, exchange
rate is yet another instrument of economic policy to be deployed in response to the needs of the economy. In this view,
the direction which exchange rate takes should not be of any
concern provided that it is in line with the overall economic
objectives set by national authorities.
Whichever view one takes whether a neutral or active exchange rate policy, it is a basic fact that a country's exchange
rate is a. matter of international concern. There is a limit to
which a country can influence the course of its exchange
rate. Apart from the effects of the -underlying domestic economic and financial conditions on exchange rate, other factors such as structural changes in world trade, shifts in international demand, and international capital flows assume
varying degrees of importance from time to time.
For developing countries, particularly countries of Africa,
the pursuit of independent exchange rate policy has not been
possible. These economies depend excessively o n international trade, and in many cases on a few primary expo rt
commodities. The size of foreign sector is very large relative
to gross national product. In addition, domestic supply capacity is weak, so that, the countries rely too heavily on imports and capital flows mainly on concessional terms. These
factors, together with historical and econo_m_ic heritage explain t he earlier Unks of national currencies of most of the
English speaking countries of Africa to pound_ sterling and
those of the French speaking countries to Fren~h franc. For
example, on attaining political independence from the
United Kingdom, Nigeria joined the International Monetary
Fund in March 1961, and declared a par value for the Nigerian Pound equal to US$2.80. Similarly the French speaking
countries declared their par values in terms of the French
franc and gold of equivalent value.
Since early sixties many countries of Africa have not
introduced fundamental changes in their exchange rate policies. The Franc Zone continues to maintain its ties with the
French franc, and Operations Account with the French
Treasury. During the French Devaluation in 1969 all the

1
The role of exchange in modern economies has been explored in
great detail. See for example, "The Role of Exchange Rate in the
Adjustment of International Payments": A Report by the Executive
Directors, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C. 1970. See
also The Reform of International Monetary Sy stem. A Report by
the Executive Directors, IMF., 1972.

The Theoretical Framework
Analysis of exchange rate change has traditionally been
conducted with a bias toward devaluation. Attention has almost exclusively been focussed on the effects of devaluation

5

CHART I
MOVEMENTS OF EXCHA GE RATES O F THE N AIRA I N T ERMS OF K EY CU RRENCI ES. 1973-19 78
(F EBRUARY 19 73 = 100)

:···...····

140

_:: ":_ .. .. .. . . _.· Pound Sterling
130

120 -

110

United States Dollar
French Franc

100

90

CHART II
MOVEMENTS OF EXCHANGE RATES OF THE NAIRA IN TERMS OF KEY CURRENCIES, 1973-1978
"(FEBRUARY 1973 = 100)

120

.

.... .
- •

:

110

90

Japanese Yen
80

Netherland Guilder
Deutsche Mark
70

6

on balance of payments, with a large body of intellectual
opinion in favour of the notion that exchange rate depreciation will, pro tanto, improve the balance of payments
position.
Initially, the analysis was conducted in a framework of
elasticities of supply and demand in international trade.
According to Alfred Marshall and A. P. Lerner, starting from
a position of equilibrium and assuming initial supply elasticities, devaluation will improve the trade balance if the sum
of price elasticities of demand of a country's imports and
exports exceeds unity. 1 Subsequently, the measurements of
these elasticities gave rise to an "elasticity pessimism" which
pointed up the practical ilifficulty of attaining the threshold
value of elasticities that is required for a devaluation to yield
desirable results. This pessimism is even more pertinent to
primary producing countries with traditionally low demand
elasticities for imports and weak supply responses. But, even
on theoretical grounds, it is recognised that the assumption
of initial conditions of trade balance, infinite supply elasticities, and exchange stability are unrealistic. Moreover, the
partial equilibrium analysis abstracts from the fact of income-induced changes as well as the alteration of the prices
of domestic goods arising from devaluation , all of which
affect the demand conditions of internationally-traded
goods.
The ilissatisfaction with this framework of analysis led to
the Absorption Approach.2 Under this approach, balance of
payments disequilibrium was attributed to an excess or deficiency of domestic expenilitures (absorption) over domestic
output. For convenience, suppose t hat Y = real income, A=
absorption or total domestic expenditures (consumption and
investments), B = trade balance; then, we can say that B =
Y - A which implies that, to improve the trade balance either
real output should increase or the level of domestic expenditures should drop.3 The difficulty of augmenting domestic
output in the short-run places the burden of adjustment on

absorption variables, and, accordingly, Harry Johnson proposed that devaluation should be accompanied by expenditure reducing and expenditure switching policies. 1 Now,
expenditure reducing policies usually imply a sacrifice of
domestic objectives such as high levels of employment and
satisfactory growth rate which the national authorities are
reluctant to undertake. Moreover, as a result of downward
inflexibility of prices expenditure reducing policies do not
often give rise to better price performance.
Hence, a new line of analysis was developed, namely the
Monetary Approach to Balance of Payments. 2 This approach, which represents the current state of the arts in the
analysis of devaluation effects is based on the assumption
that balance of payments problems derive essentially from
excessive credit expansion. From a given equilibrium with
respect to the existing stock of money, Ms, and total monetary demand, Md , a devaluation would have the effect of
reducing the value of real balances. Initially, it raises the
prices of traded goods by the amount of devaluation. Sine~
the traded goods enter into the domestic price level, the
latter rises, though by less than the amount of devaluation.
The extent of the rise in the domestic price level is moderated by the fact that the prices of non-traded goods are
largely unaffected by the devaluation, so that, they either
remain stable or rise very little. It is clear, then, that with a
given monetary stock and a higher price level, the value of
real balances will decline, and hence, real absorption will
decline, giving rise to an improvement in trade balance. 3
Recognising the important role played by real balances,
the monetarists may have opened up new approaches to balance of payments analysis. They ask: should monetary
authorities alter the exchange rate in order to bring down the
real balances to the desired leve1 or should they rely solely on
limiting t he domestic monetary base either by increasing the
reserve reqllirements or by reducing the domestic components of money supply? Should a combination of the two
techniques be adopted pari-passu? The answer to these questions depends on a number of factors (a) the size of ilisequilibrium in money market, namely the difference between
MS and Md: the wider the difference the greater the case for
devaluation; (b) the extent of structural difficulty in reducing the money supply, for example, the fear of a decline in

1
This is the so-called Marshall-Lerner condition as developed
by subsequent economists. For an excellent summary of the state of
devaluation analysis see Plister & Rothwell: Theoretical Issues in
International Economics, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1967.
2
See Sidney Alexander. Effects of Devaluation on Trade Balance.
IMF Staff Papers, II No. 2, April 1952, pp. 263-78.
3

Recall that the traditional national income identity is
Y
C+I + (X-M)
where Y
National income
C
level of consumption
I
level of investment
X
value of exports
M
value of imports
Rearranging the terms
X - M = Y - (C+I)
or B = Y -A
where B = (X-M), and A = (C+I)
Further if Y exceeds A, H(=hoarding) will take place, so that the
equation becomes B = Y - A = H
or AB = AY - AA = AH
where
A refers to "change in"
hence, for devaluation to become effective
AH> 0
or AB > 0
or AY > 6A

1
See Harry Johnson. Money Trade and Economic Growth: Unwin
University Books, Londo n, 1964, pp. I 9-21.
2
See J. J. Polak : Monetary Analysis of Income Formation and
Payments Problems. IMF Staff Papers, 1958, pp. 1-50.
3
To see the relationship between real balances and real absorption
more clearly, let us introduce additional variables. Let Dh = real
dishoarding; K = desired ratio of money to income; and Z = coefficient of adjustment of actual and desired real balances. We may
than say that:
A = Y + DH d. . .
...
(1)
DH = Z (Ms - M ) = ZM - ZKY
(2)
Substituting (2) in (I)
A = (1 - ZK) Y + ZMs
(3)
Equation (3) represents the essence of monetarist argument. Since in
the short-run Y, K, Z are constant, real absorption, A, will decline only
if Ms declines, and with a given Ms the price level P rises, implying a
decline in real money balances.
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which goods are hardly homogenous the assumption of perfect substitutability between traded goods, namely between
imports and exports is unrealistic.
One is therefore led to the conclusion that, notwithstanding the consistency, in principle, of the Monetary Approach
to Balance o f Payments, there is the need to blend it with
other forms of analysis. In particular, judgements with
respect to price and income elasticities of internationally
t raded goods as well as the degree of effectiveness of real
absorption variables will in many cases remain important.
The final decision between monetary and non-monetary
approach is an eclectic one based essentially on qualitative
judgement.

economic activity in a country which relies heavily on shortterm domestic credits and where foreign accommodation is
extremely restrictive; and (c) the rate of growth of domestic
output: presumably, the lower the growth of output the
greater is the need for devaluation because the growth of
monetary demand would not rise to the extent required for
rapid adjustment to the money supply conrutions. Where a
strictly monetary policy is adopted by, for example, limiting
the growth of domestic credit, balance of payments improves
through foreign reserve changes.
The monetary framework of analysis has also made it possible to explore the effects of devaluation on the structure of
production. We recall that a devaluation raises the prices of
traded goods by the same percentage, and the domestic price
level by less than the extent of the devaluation. Now, if
workers are not subject to money illusion they would claim
an •increase in money wages equal to the rate of domestic
price increase. This would imply a rise in money wages in the
foreign trade sector by less than the rise in prices of traded
goods. Under these conditions profits would tend to rise in
that sector thereby encouraging more investments there and
attracting more resources from other sectors. The same is
true in closely related sectors.
On the contrary, since money wages rise by more than the
rise in the prices of non-traded goods the sector producing
this category of goods suffers losses leading to a decline in
investments and a search for more profitable investment
outlets. Similarly, sectors making extensive use of foreign
inputs would experience losses due not only to money wage
increases but also to the rise in the prices of foreign factors
of production by the amount of devaluation. Sectors utilising
domestic inputs make profits.
Despite the elegance and theoretical appeal of this framework of analysis, Monetary Approach to Balance of Payments has several fundamental weaknesses. 1 The most obvious is the difficulty of est~blishing the time dimension
within which monetary policies work themselves out. Even
more important is lack of clarity with respect to the time
path learung from one equilibrium position to another. The
cost of that transition as well as the speed of adaptive processes are completely ignored. Furthermore, assumptions
regarrung the stability of income velocity can be seriously
challenged by cyclical factors and ever-changing institutional
arrangements, traditional practices, responses to industrialisation, urbanisation, gains in per capita incomes, and shifts in
income distribution. It should also be said that the relation
between external reserves and money supply is not a simple
one. An increase in reserves may not necessarily lead to an
increase in money supply if the monetary authorities deliberately sterilise the monetary effects. On the other hand, a
decline in reserves may be offset by any maintenance of
expansionary monetary policies. In adrution, in a world in

A FORMALISATION OF THE MONETARY MODEL
FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Recall that the main object of devaluation is to increase
monetary demand more than the increase in domestic credit.
Indeed, devaluation will improve the balance of payments
unless matched by an equiproportionate expansion in domestic credit.

Money demand
We may posit a demand function for money:

where

Md
p
y
k

= kpy. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . (1)
= domestic price level
= level of permanent income
= a fraction of annual income which the
public wishes to hold as cash balances.

suppose further that
p
= rpf . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . (2)
where, r is the exchange rate and pf the level of world
prices, or an index of import prices, f.o.b . Here,
we assume that domestic price level is constantly
lin ked to foreign price level via the exchange rate.

Money supply
Let the stock of money Ms be a sum total of net holdings
of foreign reserves and domestics. Then:

MS
where,

F

and

D

= F + D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (3)
= netholdingsofforeignreservesofthebank-

ing system
= net holdings of domestic assets by the
banking system (domestic credit).

Equilibrium Condition
Md

= MS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (4)

which implies that the economy adjusts in such a way that
any payments imbalance is quickly corrected. Substituting
(2) and ( 4) into (l) and into (3) after making use of the fact
that Y = pfy, the value of permanent income at world prices,
and noting that change in reserves,

'Carl P. BlackwelJ. "Reflections on the Monetary Approach to the
Balance of Payments." A paper presented at the Pacific Basin Central
Bank Conference on Econometric Modeling held in Wellington, in
November, 1977. Reprinted in IMF Survey, February 20, and March 6,
1978.
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B
M

= 6 F and further dividing by:
(= krpfy), we have
B/M = (I + g)6r/ r + g - 6D/M
where, g is the rate of growth of permanent income
valued at world prices.

obtained relating to chanfie in net foreign asset as a propor-

la) 'and net cha1ge in credit expansion as a proportion of monetary stock c.(J)
tion of monetary stock6

The periods to which data are related divide into three,
namely fi rst year, second year and third year, and all the data
are derived from the International Financial Statistics, a publication of the International Monetary Fund. To compute
6
for the first period, we first subtract net foreign asset in

Assuming a constant rate of growth of permanent income
such that gt =gt-I = g

then,

(!)

1)

Bt Bt - I
( c,rt 6 r1- - --=(I+g) - - - Mt Mt - I
Tt
rt- 1

-~:· - ::~-, ') . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

the year before devaluation from the net foreign asset in the
year of devaluation and divide the resultant figure by the
money stock at the beginning of the year preceding the devaluation. Second, we subtract the net foreign asset in the
year after devaluation from the net foreign asset the year of
devaluation and divide the result by the money stock in the

(5)

which says that the improvement of balance of payments
expressed as a proportion of money stock, depends on the
effects of nominal rate of devaluation and the rate of growth
in domestic credit, also expressed as a proportion of money
stock. The equation can be simplified further if there has not
been any devaluation in the previous period such that:
6

B)
c.r
( M = <1 + g)-;- -

6

devaluation year. c.~) is then the difference between the
first statistic and the second.
Similarly, to compute 6 (c,J ) for the first year period, we
first subtract the net foreign asset from the total money
stock of the year before devaluation, the year of devaluation
and the year after devaluation. The resultant figures, by
definition, measure the domestic credit expansion. The net
change in domestic credit expansion as a proportion of
money stock is then obtained by first subtracting the
domestic credit expansion in the year before devaluation
from the domestic credit expansion the year of devaluation and dividing the result by money stock in the year
before devaluation. Next, we subtract the domestic credit
expansion in the year after devaluation from domestic credit
expansion the year of devaluation and divide the result by
the money stock in the year of devaluation. c.(~)is then the

( c,D)

M

This equation can be regressed with data covering as much
time, possibly two years, as the adjustment in both prices
and money stock is expected to take place. We would expect
the co-efficient of domestic credit expansion to be - I and
the co-efficient of rate devaluation to be slightly more
than I .

difference between the two statistics.
The same procedure is followed for both the two-year
period and the three-year period except that the relevant
data are computed from two years and three years before
and after devaluation as the case may be, dividing the resultant statistics by the total money stock at the beginning of
each period. Note that money stock is here defined in a
narrow sense, namely currency and demand deposits. After
running the regression the following equations emerge:

DEVALUATION IN AFRICA: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
In Africa, exchange depreciations are almost always trig~ered by devaluations in the countries to which the bulk of
1er trades are traditionally tied. Nevertheless, it would be
useful to explore statistically the effects of such depreciations on the external positions of African countries and to
glean from them whether or not exchange rate policies have
an important role to play in equilibrating international transactions in these countries. It would also furnish some preliminary information about the effectiveness of other monetary variables dominated by domestic credit expansion.
For that purpose a sample of 14 countries is taken, most
of the countries belonging to the Franc Zone. Mali, Niger,
Gabon, People's Republic of the Congo, Chad, Central African
Republic, Cameroon, Malagasy Republic, Mauritania, Senegal, Ivory Coast and Dahomey each devalued by 11. I per
cent in 1969 following the devaluation of the French Franc
in that year. Two other countries, namely Ghana and Sierra
Leone which have longstanding trade relations with Britain
devalued by 30 per cent and 14.3 per cent respectively following the devaluation of the pound sterling in 1967. Nigeria
devalued by 10 per cent in 1973. For each coun try, data are

0
For the One Year Period c.(!) = 0.32 + 0.26 ~r - 0.77 c.(~ )
R2 =.40 .... . {1)

{0.12)

(0.90)

(0.30)

F =3.66

For the Two Year Period c. (t)= 0.32 - 2. 15 ~r - 0.98 6 (~}
R2 = .63 ..... {2)

(0.22)

(1.46)

{0.24)

F = 9.36

6

For the Three Year Period c. (~) = 0.70 - 4.73
R2 = .69 ..... (3)

{0.32)

(2.2)

: -

(0.24)

1.07

a(~)

F = 12.24

*The results are based o n a cross-section study, and the figures in
parenthesis are standard errors. (Nigeris is excluded from the sample
because devaluatio n in I 97 3 was followed by an appreciation a year

after.)
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Looking first at the first year equation, it is clear that
both the rate of devaluation and growth in domestic credit
do not adequately explain the change in net foreign reserves,
R2 = .40. F test also shows that the effects of the co-efficients, taken together, are insignificant statistically. However,
the effect of one of the variables is highly significant at 5 per
cent level. The co-efficient of the credit expansion term is
-0.7 which is close to the statistically expected value of -1.
If we set up of a hypothesis of -1 , t -0.766 as against the
critical value of 2.201, so that, we cannot reject it. On the
other hand, the exchange rate co-efficient is much less than 1
and not statistically significant at 5 per cent level. On inspection we would reject a hypothesis of l, and since t = 0 .29 we
would readily reject the hypothesis that exchange rate
depreciation makes a significant contribution to balance of
payments.
For the two-year period R 2 increases to .63, F yields
9.36, and the coefficient of credit expansion improves to
-.98; t value = - .083, again showing that we cannot reject
the hypotheses that its true value is -1. However, the coefficient of the exchange rate terms is now negative, and the
t value is - l .47 which leads us to reject the hypothesis of any
significant exchange rate effects on the balance of payments.
Finally, over the three-year period the R 2 improves further to .69 and F = 12.24. The co-efficient of the credit
expansion, -1 .07 slightly exceeds the theoretical value of -1 ;
t = 0.292. For the exchange rate variable, however, the coefficient is unusually large in absolute terms and negative; t =
-2.15, so that, again we can say that exchange rate term is
not significant.
The intercept terms are all positive and small and statistically not different from zero at 5 per cent level of significant. That t values for the 1st year equation is 0.266; 2nd
year equation 1.45; and 3rd year equation 2.18.
These results lead to some important conclusions. First, in
the short run, it cannot be said that exchange rate depreciation is a crucial policy instrument for improving the balance
of payments of the country considered. By contrast, it would
appear that sharp reductions in the rate of domestic credit
expansion following a devaluation could account for majo r
improvement in the balance of payments position. This conclusion while valid in itself must be taken with some caution. The sample data do not reveal any wide variability in
devaluation rates. Recall that the devaluations of the countries of the Franc Zone were neither independent nor of
varying orders. There is also the possibility that the actual
degrees of devaluations grossly understate the extent needed
to bring about improvements in the balance of payments
positions. in any event, decisions relating to the relevant size
of devaluation to secure a given improvement in the balance
of payments may not be central to the formulation of exchange rate policies in Africa. It would be more rewarding to
focus more sharply on monetary variables particularly the
net changes in domestic credit.
Secondly, any effects of devaluations on the balance of
payments of African countries are not fully felt in the first
year after devaluation. indeed, full adjustment to devaluation
takes place between the second and third years. This conclu10

sion is generally in line with known facts about devaluation
effects in many countries. One of the main reasons why devaluation is not effective in the first year is that in many
countries devaluation enables the authorities to dismount exchange restrictions to accord with the regulations and
requirements of the International Monetary Fund. A second
reason much more relevant to Africa is that the adjustment
to the deterioration in te,ms of trade consequent to devaluation takes time as a result of inelasticities of supply and
demand in international trade, a phenomenon widely recognised as the J curve effect.
Owing to the relatively less important role played by the
exchange rate adjustment in the short run, together with the
zero intercept presumed, it would be possible to neglect the
exchange rate variable, and relate improvements in the balance of payments to net changes in domestic credit expansion. Charts III, IV and V depict the adjustment positions of
the 14 countries over the first, second and third year periods.
These charts show that the balance of payments adjustment
to movements in domestic liquidity improve with time following a devaluation. Full adjustment takes place after the
second year of d~valuation, and from the third year, disequilibrium re-emerges in a number of countries, although
considerable improvements in balance of payments have been
recorded in a great majority of the countries.
Note that the line passing through the second quadrant
has a slope equal to -1, being the line on which all the points
are expected to fall. It represents a line of perfect adjustment. Countries with points above the horizontal axis have
experienced an improvement in their balance of payments
after devaluation. Those with points below the horizontal
axis have experienced a deterioration. Similarly, countries
with points to the right of the vertical axis have allowed for
an increase in rate of domestic credit expansion while those
with points to the left of the vertical axis have experienced a
decline in the rate of growth of domestic credit. It is clear
then, that a great majority of countries that have brought
down their rates of credit expansion following a devaluation
record an improvement in their balance of payments positions.

SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR EXCHANGE RATE AND
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS POLICIES IN NIGERIA
For a developing country such as ours exchange rate policy is not a powerful instrument for influencing the outlook
for our balance of payments, particularly in the short run.
The main reasons are fairly well known. First, as mentioned
earlier, our trade position may not be improved. indeed, the
effect of depreciation is to worsen the terms of trade, and
adjustments to the altered international trade prices take
time to materialize. Secondly, in the short run, prices of our
primary export commodities including petroleum might have
been predetermined in the world markets, so that, exchange
depreciation is unlikely to confer any important benefits in
terms of increased export receipts. Thirdly, owing to our
growing need for imports, currency depreciation would have
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creased foreign debt servicing. And, to offset those costs at
least partially, it would be necessary to aim not only at the
total reduction in spending and in the growth of domestic
credit, but also at a desirable structural distribution of spending between consumption and investment, and between
projects of longer term gestation and those promising
immediate returns. An allocation of credit along these lines
will also play a vital role.
However, to focus exclusively on short term effects of
exchange rate depreciation would grossly under-estimate the
usefulness of exchange rate policy for improving resource
allocation in a developing country as well as supporting the
urgently needed development efforts. As a price, the exchange rate performs an allocative function, and here lies the
case for pursuing a more purposeful exchange rate policy. In
this context, it would mean a devaluation where exchange
rate ove r-valuation has been strongly established, and to
make such a case we must establish clearly that the naira is
overvalued. Unfortunately, there is no generally acceptable
statistical test for overvaluation of a currency. However,
there are known guidelines for assessing the appropriateness
of an exchange rate. First of all, a review of cost and price
relationships in Nigeria compared with the trends in our
major trading partners shows a marked weakening in our
competitive position. Over the past three years, inflation
rates averaged 8 per cent in the United States, 17 per cent in
the United Kingdom, and 25 per cent in Nigeria. Wages have
also risen highest in Nigeria due principally to unusually high
wages awards in 1975. Lower cost of production would also
have enabled us to maintain our competitive position in the
primary commodity market apart from providing a stimulus
for the development of import competing goods.
Secondly, the continuous loss of exchange reserves as well
as increased resort to trade and exchange restrictions in an
effort to prevent further losses broadly indicate a fundamental disequilibrium in the external position. During the
regime of par values any emergence of fundamental disequilibrium would have prompted an exchange alteration
deemed . in the interest not only of the devaluating country
but also of the payments adjustment process of the world as
a whole. Thirdl y, there is an intuitive explanation for the
view that the naira is overvalued. We recall that the naira was
appreciated in mid petroleum boom. At that time, it was
considered that the vastly strengthened overall external payments position of the country warranted that action. Other
countries in similar positions took the same action. Now that
the petroleum export prospects are dim it may be the case
that reversal of that exchange rate policy would be in order.
There is another way in which the appropriateness of an
exchange rate may be judged. Exchange rate is said to be
sustainable in both objective and subjective senses. It is sustainable in an objective sense if a stable rate evolves over
time. In the context of the generalised floating of exchange
rates, at present, it would mean an exchange rate that endures after the interplay of market forces in the fo reign exchange market. In a subjective sense an exchange rate is
sustainable if in the judgement of the authorities a given
exchange rate can be maintained over a medium term by

entailed inevitably higher import prices, including the import
prices for raw material. And fourthly, the fear is always
prevalent that devaluation would add to inflationary forces
either directly through the effects of higher import prices on
domestic price level or indirectly by encouraging excessive
wage claims. These short term costs are of course, partially
offset by increased value of external assets in situations
where a devaluation does not provoke equi-proportiate devaluations by the major reserve centres. There is also a possibility of reflow of speculative capital particularly where
speculative positions have been building up in anticipation of
exchange depreciation.
Again, for a large number of African countries including
ours, statistical evidence points to a preoccupation with the
use of monetary policy instruments, mainly the curtailment
of domestic credit expansion to achieve better balance of
payments positions. This would require a severe limitation of
the cash requirements of the public sector which is usually
the major source of growth in money supply. It would also
require a continuous review of government expenditu re policies aimed at achieving a non-inflationary financing of development projects. Other domestic policy instruments need
also to be put together for stabilising domestic demand as
well as overcoming a renewal of inflationary pressures in an
effort to reduce the short term costs of devaluation. In
particular, the necessity to keep watch over the growth of
real incomes by means of wage and price policies could be
explored to advantage, although it is well recognised that
success of incomes policies invariably depends on institutional setting concerned, particularly in regard to the process
of wage negotiations as well as the pattern of claims of other
competing groups on the national product.
In our Nigerian environment, the experience provided by
the 1973 depreciation of the naira is not much to go by.
Nevertheless, it is well known that exchange rate depreciation was unmatched by relevant demand restraining measures. Although, in that year, domestic credit expansion grew
by 11.5 per cent compared with 22.2 per cent in the preceding year, and, indeed , fell precipitously by 129 per cent in
1974, a special factor was responsible for those developments. The buoyancy of petroleum revenues completely
removed the need for financial discipline, such that, the public sector was in a net creditor position with respect to the
banking system between May 1974 and October 1976. However, as from November, 1976, the growth of domestic credit
took a turn for the worse.
Still , in 1975, barely two years after devaluation , wage
claims were allowed to grow by a large margin. Overall government expenditu res increased by 11 6.9 per cent over the
previous year. Inflation rate resumed an upward trend, and ,
the naira was allowed to appreciate with respect to important
currencies, thus offsetting the advantages of an earlier
depreciation.
It is, therefore, difficult to assess the magnitude of short
term costs, or any positive effects of the 1973 depreciation
of the naira. In a normal situation such costs should include
possible losses in output and employment arising from deflationary policies, together with any budgetary burden of in14

tude may be so great as to exert an unsettling effect on the
economy as a whole without instantaneously achieving the
needed external balance. As mentioned earlier, inflation rate
initially approaches the rate of devaluation, followed quickly
by compensatory wage claims, which, in turn , brings further
pressures on prices. Hence, it would be advantageous to act
on the exchange rate as soon as fundamental disequilibrium
is detected. Moreover, there is merit in achieving a given
amount devaluation in small stages to the extent that undesirable market reactions are minimised and devaluation, in
itself, becomes more politically acceptable.
Again, it is clear that exchange rate policies cannot be
discussed in isolation from other financial policies. In fact ,
the problem has always centred on an appropriate degree of
financing and adjustment to adverse balance of payments
developments. Exchange rate action is considered the last
resort when all other corrective measures have proved inadequate to eliminate an overall deficit. In the present Nigerian
circumstances one wonders whether balance of payments
financing and adjustment have gone far enough, and whether
a suitable balance between the two has been struck. Apart
from the continuous draw-down of our foreign reserves as
well as the opening up of an international credit channel in
amount of $US2.5 billion, no efforts have so far been made
to make use of our credit facilities in the International Monetary Fund. Our Reserve Tranche position is still outstanding.
Total drawings under any of the four credit tranches have
not yet been considered. Moreover, such facilities as Extended Fund Facility, Supplementary Facility, Compensatory Financing Facility for Export Fluctuations, and even
Buffer Stock Financing Facility have not yet been explored.
No doubt, the total amount of financial resources that can be
yielded by any or a combination of these facilities may not
be substantial, nevertheless, if taken at the early stage of
balance of payments disequilibrium it could serve as a " bridging operation," providing the Nigerian authorities sufficient
time to initiate and see through any suitable domestic adjustment measures.
Moreover, any assistance from the International Monetary
Fund, apart from the Reserve Tranche drawings, carries varying degrees of conditionality aimed at encouraging the mem ber country to adopt appropria te adjustment policies. 1n my
view, Nigeria should overcome her political obstacles in order
to avail herself of both technical and financial assistance
from the International Monetary Fund. Strict financial principles indicate that a country should first seek cheaper international credit before resorting to large scale borrowing from
Euro-currency market at exorbitant commercial terms.
With respect to domestic adjustment policies I am also of
the opinion that more could have been done to cushion the
impact of deepening balance of payment problems. The
signal of a sharp reversal of our balance of payments position
in 1976 coupled with exchange rate depreciation in relation
to virtually all of Nigeria's major trading partners should have
served as a warning of a probable deterioration in our external position in the years immediately ahead. The public
sector would then have scaled down domestic spending, defining priorities and limiting domestic borrowing. More

means of appropriate controls of both trade and payments as
well as growth in domestic demand. Judged by both standards the present naira rate does not appear to be sustainable.
Our bleak balance of payments outlook together with our
deteriorating domestic financial situation do not raise any
hope of a durable exchange rate defined in an objective
sense. At the same time the increased resort to protectionism, far from protecting the naira rate and the level of
external reserves, might lead to gross distortions in domestic
prices and resource allocation leading to longer term worsening of balance of payments as well as patterns of international trade flows.
Still the case for the devaluation rests on a number of
important planks. As a country with a considerable potential
for rapid development our basic aim should be to achieve a
breadth of economic diversification. An appropriate exchange rate would greatly assist in that effort mainly by
encouraging the development of new exports and domestic
substitutes for imports and by reducing real incomes and real
costs to levels compatible with higher capacity utilisation and
full employment. Exchange rate depreciation would also play
an important role of channelling expenditure from consumption to investment and resources from domestic to foreign
sector. 1n this way, a well conceived exchange rate policy
would not only assist the process of capital fonnation but
also help to strengthen the foreign sector of our economy.
The effects of a downward exchange rate adjustment on
capital goods import is mixed. The initial effect is to raise the
prices of these goods which initially, at least, renders capitalisation of domestic industries more difficult. However, where
labour is physically more abundant, and unemployment,
both open and disguised, poses a potential problem while
labour costs are artificially held up, as it would appear in
Nigeria, exchange rate would usefully alter factor price ratios
in favour of labour using techniques of production. The ultimate effect on the rate of productivity increase would depend on the efficiency of labour use compared to the loss in
output due to decline in capital input including the effects of
embodied technology transfer.
Certain sectors of the economy are likely to benefit more
from devaluation. The foreign sector, particularly the agricultural component would receive windfall gains arising from
higher prices to be negotiated on the basis of a new exchange
rate. The surpluses accumulated by the commodity Boards
would enable the authorities to increase producer prices at
appropriate times or at least prevent a reduction which
would have been dictated by unfavourable world market
trends. To the extent that an increase in producer prices
creates incentives to farmers to e_x pand acreage, exchange
rate depreciation provides a stimulus to domestic production
and allows for a greate r utilisation for farm lands.
It may be useful to comment briefly on the timeliness as
well as the procedures of exchange rate actions necessary to
bring the international payments back to equilibrium. It is
common knowledge that a delayed devaluation allows for a
build up of speculative positions while domestic financial
imbalance deepens, and distortions in cost/price structure
worsens. When finally devaluation is resorted to the magni-
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permanent income valued at
world prices . . . . . .. . ... . . . .. .

attempts would have been made to mobilise domestic savings, particularly by sharply reducing current expenditures.
Increased social expenditures would have been unnecessary,
and a considerable part of non-economic expenditures needed to be cut drastically. In addition, domestic tax effort
could have been stepped up, particularly by means of improved tax administration. No review of interest rate policy
was undertaken until of late, such that, with sharply rising
inflation rate, interest rates became too low and even steeply
negative in real terms. In short, domestic economic and
financial adjustments had come too late.

(5)

Substituting (2) and ( 4) into (I) we have
Md = krpfy = krY
Substituting further into 3
Md = krpfy = F + D or
F = krpfy - D
or 6 F = k~rpfy)- 6 D
let 6 f = B, and noting what pfy = Y
we have B = k6(rY) - 60
or B = (k 6r . Y + 6 Y . r + 6 r6 Y) - 6 0

CONCLUDING REMARKS

orB=k6 r(Y+ 6 Y)+ 6 Y. r- 6 D
Dividing through by M = krY we have

Evidence both in theory and practice reveal the very limited role which exchange rate adjustment, taken in isolation,
can play in equilibrating international transactions in the
short run. This conclusion is pertinent to developing countries, particularly the countries forming the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) of which Nigeria is
a prominent member, and it is based essentially on "elasticity
pessimism". However, in com bination with stringent monetary policies aimed at restrainin g the growth of domestic
credit, an exchange rate depreciation should improve the
balance of pay men ts picture considerably . Since the effects
of devaluation are more fully felt after two years, there are
sufficient grounds for supposing that greater reliance should
be placed on monetary policy instruments in the years immediately after devaluation in order to consolidate the gains
in external position. Moreover, the short term costs of devaluation may be mitigated by appropriate demand management policies, particularly the public expenditure component, with a view to reducing the inflationary consequences
and balance of payments pressures.
In any event, for a developing country such as ours, the
case for exchange rate depreciation at the recognition of a
fundamental disequilibrium rests ultimately on the need to
improve resource allocation. This need will be realised as
resources move gradually from consumption to investment,
from import to export trade, and from social to purely
economic activities. The time dimension and the speed of
adjustment process clearly fall outside the scope of this
paper.

J! = k6 rY + k6 r6 Y + k6 Yr _ 6 0
M

M

(2)

hence, M5 = F + D money supply process
Md = M 5

monetary equilibrium

r

r

6Y

Denoting T

!

M

Y

Y M

as g we have the final equation:

= ~ r (I + g) + g - ~D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(6)
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